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ABSTRACT 
Marie-Luise Mußenbrock: A (Mis)alignment of Governance Structures? The Two Water 
Concessions in Metro Manila. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of 
Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 108/2013). 
Improving the quality of water services is vital in many developing countries. In order to ad-
dress the issue, many of them launched a series of reforms of which a major element was the 
involvement of the private sector. However, private sector participation (PSP) did not prove to 
be a general panacea. In some cases it has led to improved water service quality, such as in-
creased access and reduced water losses. In other cases it has resulted in deteriorated perfor-
mance, including high tariffs and potentially negative impacts on health and the environment. 
The question is under which circumstances PSP can positively or negatively impact on the pro-
vision of water services. This INEF Report analyses the varying performance of the two water 
concessions in Metro Manila through the lens of the theory of Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE). It shows that a misalignment of governance structures (organisational constructs) ac-
cording to the level of transaction costs leads to worse water service provision. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Verbesserung der Wasserversorgung ist von entscheidender Bedeutung in vielen Entwick-
lungsländern. Um das Problem anzugehen, verabschiedeten viele von ihnen eine Reihe von 
Reformen, von denen ein wesentlicher Bestandteil die Beteiligung des privaten Sektors ist. Al-
lerdings ist diese kein „Allheilmittel“. In einigen Fällen hat sie zur Verbesserung der Wasser-
versorgung beigetragen. Dies verdeutlichen unter anderem der vermehrte Zugang zu Wasser 
und die Abnahme von Wasserverlusten. In anderen Fällen führte die Beteiligung zu verschlech-
terten Serviceleistungen, was hohe Tarife und potentiell negative Auswirkungen auf Gesund-
heit und Umwelt zeigen. Somit stellt sich die Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen sich die Betei-
ligung des privaten Sektors positiv oder negativ auf die Wasserversorgung auswirkt. Dieser 
INEF-Report analysiert die unterschiedliche Servicequalität der beiden Wasserkonzessionen in 
Metro Manila anhand der Transaktionskostentheorie. Er zeigt, dass eine Fehlanpassung der 
Governance-Strukturen (Organisationsformen) in Anlehnung an die Höhe der Transaktionskos-
ten zu einer verschlechterten Wasserversorgung führt. 
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1. Introduction1 
According to estimates from the WHO, about 780 million people do not have 
access to drinking water and 2.5 billion people are lacking appropriate sanita-
tion services in developing countries. This negatively impacts on health and 
causes disease (UNICEF/WHO 2012: 2; WHO 2009). Moreover, it is estimated 
that by 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in countries or regions with abso-
lute water scarcity, implying an increasing shortage of the resource (UN-
Water/FAO 2007: 10). As these numbers illustrate, expanding the coverage and 
improving the quality of water services is extremely important. In order to ad-
dress the issue, many developing countries – often under pressure from inter-
national financial institutions – launched a series of reforms of the water sector, 
of which a major element was the involvement of the private sector (Marin 
2009: 13; Budds/McGranahan 2003). On the one hand, many states were notice-
ably failing to deliver water services in an efficient and effective way. On the 
other hand, the need to attract private capital investment and reform the sector 
through a reallocation of roles, incentives and accountability drove the initia-
tion of privatisation (Krause 2009). Although there are arguments in favour of 
privatisation, it is unreasonable to think that it is a general panacea. In fact, 
private sector participation (PSP), resulting in various governance structures, 
such as complete privatisation, i.e. market governance, or public-private part-
nerships (PPPs), involves many risks. Besides the economic hazards related to a 
monopolistic sector, access to and quality of water services impact on health 
and the environment, among other things, turning them into highly politicised 
services (OECD 2009: 9-10). 
Despite these risks, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of water ser-
vices is vital in many developing countries. The question, then, is whether PSP 
can bring additional value into the provision of water services, and if so, under 
which circumstances. In order to give a tentative answer to this question, I in-
tend to analyse the varying performance of the two water concessions in Metro 
Manila through the lens of the theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). 
Subsequent to two early articles of Ronald Coase (Coase 1937; Coase 1960), TCE 
has been increasingly used to analyse various social arrangements in recent 
years. It aims to explain the relative efficiency of different governance struc-
tures, meaning organisational forms of exchange, in handling and organising a 
transaction and, hence, transaction costs (Williamson 2005). The theory thus 
offers a valuable analytical framework, as it is especially “well-suited to the 
[analysis] of complex contracting and nonmarket organization” (Williamson 
2005: 41), such as the introduction of PSP in the water sector. Transactions are 
economic exchanges which involve the transfer of associated property rights 
between two or more contracting parties, for example in the form of privatisa-
                                                          
1  I would like to gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions by col-
leagues at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-
Essen, on an earlier draft of the report. 
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tion. Contracts are assumed to be incomplete, as the contracting parties are not 
able to include all future contingencies, so that transaction costs arise in negoti-
ating, monitoring and enforcing contracts. In order to economise transaction 
costs, economic actors aim to align transactions, which have different character-
istics, to governance structures (organisational constructs) in a discriminating 
way. The different governance structures have varying adaptive capacities to 
efficiently deal with transaction costs (Williamson 2005: 51). However, what 
happens if economic agents fail to adequately align governance structures? 
Does this have an impact on performance levels?  
In the report, the two water concessions in Metro Manila serve as instructive 
empirical examples to answer these questions for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, they allow the application of a most-similar case approach, as many 
framework conditions in both concessions are very alike. Consequently, many 
of the explanatory factors for the success and failure of water privatisation pro-
cesses can be held constant. On the other hand, despite similar circumstances, 
the service quality of both concessionaires varies immensely, with the East Zone 
concessionaire being successful and the West Zone concessionaire facing huge 
difficulties. This empirical puzzle calls for an explanation which I intend to give 
with the help of the theory of TCE. The analysis will show that, while many 
underlying factors can be held constant, different levels of transaction costs are 
observable in the two concessions. These were arguably disregarded during the 
privatisation process leading to a (dis-)economisation of transaction costs. In 
other words, I argue that a misalignment of governance structures according to 
the level of transaction costs led to worse water service provision in the West 
Zone concession, while an alignment of governance structures in the East Zone 
improved water supply. 
Since privatisation and PSP in the provision of public services are highly 
contested, with a particularly fierce debate arising over the issue of water, as a 
resource essential for life, the following will, first, embed the research question 
in the scholarly debate. I begin with a discussion of the conceptual arguments 
for and against PSP in the water sector, followed by a review of existing empiri-
cal evidence for the success and failure of PSP and the determining factors. The 
second part will elaborate on the two water utilities in Metro Manila, including 
a closer examination of the similar framework conditions and a presentation of 
the varying performance of the two water concessions. The third part outlines 
the theory of TCE in detail in order to provide the analytical framework. With 
the help of this framework, the fourth section investigates the different levels of 
transaction costs of the East and West Zone concessions in Metro Manila. Here, 
secondary data, such as annual reports, case studies, evaluations and monitor-
ing reports, served as the main source of information. In addition, I collected 
primary data from six semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders 
involved in the privatisation process during a field study in Metro Manila in 
September and October 2011. Finally, the concluding part sums up the major 
findings of the study, briefly describes some of its limitations and puts the anal-
ysis into broader perspective, on the basis of which future research possibilities 
are identified. 
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2. The debate on PSP in the water sector 
The debate on PSP in the water sector starts with the terminology used. In a 
strict sense, the term “privatisation” only relates to the sale of assets to the pri-
vate sector, initiating the private ownership of water infrastructure, whereas 
PSP and PPPs involve a variety of contracts between public and private actors 
ranging from rather simple service contracts to more complex concession and 
divestures. They differ in terms of the ownership structure, the length of the 
contract, the division of responsibilities for operation and maintenance and as 
well as funding and the compensation scheme adopted (Bakker 2010: xv; ADB 
2008a: 2-3). An overview of different types of PPPs and their key features can be 
found in Table 1 below. Complete privatisations are rarely implemented, so that 
purely private water supply is very uncommon, while PPPs in the water sector 
are more commonly based on medium-term-arrangements, such as manage-
ment contracts, than on long-term arrangements. Within these arrangements, 
public authorities do not only retain ownership of the assets involved, but more 
importantly have the possibility to pursue social and ecological goals through 
regulation (Houdret/Shabafrouz 2006: 9). 
 
Table 1: Summary of different types of PPPs 
 
Service 
Contract 
Management 
Contract 
Lease/ 
Af-
fermage 
Conces-
sion 
Divesture 
Asset Own-
ership 
Public Public Public Public Private 
Contract 
Duration 
1-3 years 2-5 years 8-15 years 
20-30 
years 
Infinite 
Operation & 
Maintenance 
Public/ 
private 
Private Private Private Private 
Capital In-
vestment 
Public Public Public Private Private 
Compensa-
tion Terms 
Unit pric-
es 
Fee (with 
performance 
incentives) 
Portion of 
tariff rev-
enues 
All/part 
of tariff 
revenues 
Tariff 
revenues 
Source: adapted from OECD 2009: 20 and ADB 2008a: 28 
 
Although the terms “privatisation”, “PSP” and “PPPs” differ in points of detail, 
their common feature is that they generally entail some form of restructuring of 
governance and the application of market-based norms, values and practices 
(Bakker 2010: xv). For ease of reference, I will therefore use the terms inter-
changeably, which simultaneously highlights these common features. With 
these differences in terminology in mind, the study will now turn to the general 
debate on PSP in the water sector.  
In essence, the debate reflects the fact that there are differing views about the 
appropriate role of the state and market, whereby either market or state failure 
Marie-Luise Mußenbrock 
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is accentuated (Bakker 2010: 5; Davis 2005: 146). Many of the pro- and counter-
arguments recall similar discussions on privatisation in relation to electricity 
and telecommunications, for example. However, the debate about water – a 
highly politicised resource – has been particularly fierce, as it relates to social, 
economic and ecological issues of sustainability (Bakker 2010: 15; Hou-
dret/Shabafrouz 2006: 11). In this context, the ambiguous character of water has 
played an important role. On the one hand, water is a (scarce) economic re-
source serving as an input in various production processes. On the other hand, 
we cannot consider water a commodity like any other, as it has religious, spir-
itual and environmental connotations as well as being a non-substitutable re-
source essential for life (Bakker 2010: 21-30; Hukka/Katko 2003: 152). Access to 
drinking water is therefore a necessary condition for health and well-being as 
well as being a basic element of social justice (Houdret/Shabafrouz 2006: 14). In 
relation to this, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
asserted in 2002 that every person has a human right to “sufficient, safe, ac-
ceptable, physically accessible, and affordable water” (UN ECOSOC 2002: 2).  
The multiple functions of water in human development complicate the man-
agement of the water sector. Supplying drinking water is a complex undertak-
ing which entails various difficulties, from harnessing (new) water sources to 
developing the necessary infrastructure for (drinking) water treatment, storage 
and distribution. Any reforms and manipulation of the water sector immediate-
ly affect the resource’s quantity and quality, which may have far-reaching im-
pacts on social, economic and ecological sustainability (Houdret/Shabafrouz 
2006: 8, 18). This ambiguous character of water and all accompanying issues 
have to be carefully considered by the water utilities, whether privately or pub-
licly run, so that equitable distribution patterns are implemented and water 
resource depletion is avoided (Houdret/Shabafrouz 2006: 32-33).  
2.1 Public versus private: the conceptual debate 
Proponents of PSP in the water sector point out the failure of many govern-
ments, especially in developing countries, to provide adequate water services. 
Low coverage rates, low rates of cost recovery, deteriorating infrastructure, 
high levels of non-revenue water (NRW), overstaffing and un-responsiveness to 
the poor exemplify poor water service delivery (Bakker 2010: 87; Marin 2009: 19; 
Davis 2005: 154). Proponents of PSP ascribe the absence of adequate water sup-
ply to deficient government management due to a lack of expertise and incen-
tives for efficiency, and to rent-seeking behaviour, corruption as well as under-
investment (Budds/McGrahan 2003: 97; Bakker 2010: 87; Marin 2009: 18, Davis 
2005: 154). They hail the private sector as a means to improve service delivery 
by introducing more efficient management methods, technical expertise and 
innovation as a result of the profit motive. A contract with clear and concise 
goals, as opposed to the manifold and often inconsistent motives of public wa-
ter utilities, is argued to further improve water service delivery. In addition, the 
introduction of competition and a sense of arms-length accountability to cus-
tomers drive efficiency (Marin, 2009: 19; Davis, 2005: 154). Customer satisfaction 
is of particular concern to private utilities, as a reduced number of complaints 
results in lower administrative costs and higher profits. Satisfied customers are 
also more willing to pay their bills on time and in full (Davis 2005: 174)  
A (Mis)alignment of Governance Structures? 
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Advocates of PSP often associate the reasoning related to increased efficien-
cy with a pro-poor argument (Bakker 2010: 97-98; Rogers/de Silva/Bhatia 2002: 
15). Although it sounds counter-intuitive that a profit-seeking supplier will 
serve the poor, proponents contend that on the basis of increased efficiency and 
the introduction of cost-recovering tariffs, additional resources become availa-
ble. These resources enable higher connection rates to the water infrastructure 
to be achieved, which specifically benefits poor households which were not 
previously connected to the water system (Bakker 2010: 98; Rogers/de Sil-
va/Bhatia 2002: 2, 15; Davis, 2005: 154). The necessary cross-subsidising tariff 
structures, whereby high-income households pay higher tariffs than poor 
households, can be implemented in privately and publicly operated water utili-
ties through tariff regulations. Consequently, low-income households do not 
have to rely on alternative sources, such as dug wells, which often only offer 
water of poor quality and unpredictable availability, or water vendors whose 
services are, as studies have shown, up to ten times more expensive (Bakker 
2010: 98; Wu/Malaluan 2008: 208; Galiani/Gertler/Schargrodsky 2005: 87). Ser-
vice quality is simultaneously improved and as much of the water, a scarce 
resource, is saved as possible because cost-covering prices encourage more effi-
cient resource allocation (Bakker 2007: 432; Rogers/de Silva/Bhatia 2002: 2) Alt-
hough state utilities are arguably also able to introduce the principle of cost 
recovery, they often face political impediments which make it impossible to 
introduce the necessary tariff increases (Budds/McGranahan 2003: 97; 
Wu/Malaluan 2008: 207; Davis 2005: 154). Hence, proponents perceive privatisa-
tion of water utilities as a means to de-politicise the water sector, whereby gov-
ernment subsidies can be reduced or even abolished, releasing funds for other 
public purposes (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 208; Davis 2005: 154). Next to capital made 
available by cost-covering tariffs, proponents claim that considerable private 
investment to expand and improve the water infrastructure will accompany the 
introduction of PSP. However, after two decades of water privatisation, even 
wholehearted proponents have realised that this goal has not been achieved 
(Bakker 2010: 99; Castro 2008: 66, 68; Davis 2005: 155; Marin 2009: 123). This 
leads us to the arguments against PSP, many of which may also have led to less 
private investment than was initially expected (Bakker 2010: 94).  
Opponents hold that PSP in the water sector may entail many risks and 
costs. In economic terms, high fixed costs in connection with long-term irrevo-
cable investments and inelastic demand turn the water sector into a natural 
monopoly, making government regulation indispensable (Kirkpat-
rick/Parker/Zhang 2006: 146; World Bank 2006: 2; Hukka/Katko 2003: 143, 153; 
Galiani/Gertler/Schargrodsky 2005: 87). The monopolistic character also limits 
the possibility to introduce effective competition in the market, even in compar-
ison to other monopolistic markets such as telecommunications and energy 
supply. Transporting water entails higher costs than transmitting phone calls or 
electricity. Different sources of water cannot be mixed either, as this might im-
pact negatively on water quality. Hence, it is only possible to introduce compe-
tition for the market through competitive bidding processes (Kirkpat-
rick/Parker/Zhang 2006: 146; Clarke/Kosec/Wallsten 2009: 328).  
However, problems of asymmetric information and incumbent advantages 
may hamper the bidding process. Moreover, only a small number of potential 
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10 
bidders feature in the water sector (McIntosh 2003: 2; Davis 2005: 152). This 
encourages opportunistic behaviour, resulting in over-optimistic offers which 
are expected to be re-negotiated ex post (Marin 2009: 28; Kirkpat-
rick/Parker/Zhang 2006: 156; Clarke/Kosec/Wallsten 2009: 347). This is especial-
ly true of developing countries whose institutional capacities may be too weak 
to effectively enforce contracts (Marin 2009: 14; Hukka/Katko 2003: 147). Even 
in the absence of opportunistic behaviour, it is difficult for private operators to 
make a realistic bid, as much of the water infrastructure is underground, so that 
an assessment of network conditions is not easy (World Bank 2006: 2; Marin 
2009: 19; Davis 2005: 152). Considering the fact that contracts are often negotiat-
ed on a long-term basis, they are incomplete, as they cannot include all future 
contingencies. As a result, adjustments with regard to tariffs, volumes and other 
targets are likely (Kirkpatrick/Parker/Zhang 2006: 156). In addition, commercial 
risks, foreign-exchange risks, arbitrary political interference, political risks ex-
emplified by major protest movements and complex pricing policies are other 
problems confronting public and private investors. As a result of these risks, 
capital costs for water infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion are often 
relatively higher for the private sector as compared to the public sector (OECD 
2009: 9-10; Bakker 2010: 94-97, 101; Davis 2005: 155; Hukka/Katko 2003: 152; 
Clarke/Kosec/Wallsten 2009: 328, 330; Marin 2009: 126). Opponents further con-
tend that the introduction of PSP may not necessarily increase efficiency due to 
commercial incentives. On the contrary, private operators might be able to 
make profits mainly from tariff increases, which they are able to enforce due to 
poorly informed regulators (Budds/McGranahan 2003: 97). As a result, tariffs 
and connection charges may well be too high, especially for low-income house-
holds (Davis 2005: 169; Budds/McGranahan 2003: 109). In contrast, public water 
utilities may out-perform privately run utilities in terms of effectiveness, equity 
and accountability if they are appropriately reformed and resourced (Bakker 
2010: 2; Baietti/Kingdom/van Kinneken 2006)  
On more normative grounds, opponents voice apprehension about transfer-
ring the control of such essential services to a profit-oriented company, as this 
may entail considerable negative externalities on health and the environment 
(Bakker 2010: 81; Davis 2005: 147). Opponents of PSP emphasise the human 
right to water and argue that by recognising this basic right, states are ethically 
responsible for the provision of water.2 In other words, the introduction of 
market structures in the water sector is argued to be incompatible with guaran-
teeing the human right to water (Bakker 2007: 437; Bakker 2010: 136-138). How-
ever, the counter-argument is that the human right to water does not necessari-
ly de-legitimise the introduction of PSP (Bakker 2010: 150, Budds/McGranahan 
2003: 95). In fact, many proponents of PSP stress the human right to water 
which can, in their opinion, only be realised through the involvement of the 
private sector (Bakker 2010: 150).  
                                                          
2  For a detailed discussion of the opportunities and challenges associated with 
the human right to water, which would go beyond the scope of this report, 
see Bakker (2007), Bakker (2010: 147-152). 
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Many of the arguments advanced by proponents of PSP are refuted by the 
counter-arguments of opponents and vice versa, so that no common position is 
in sight. The next section will scrutinise empirical evidence on the comparative 
performance of publicly and privately operated water utilities to see whether a 
clearer picture emerges. 
2.2 Public versus private: empirical evidence 
The performance of a publicly compared to a privately run water supply is at 
the centre of the debate on PSP in the water sector. Although numerous empiri-
cal studies on this issue exist, they have been unable to answer this question 
satisfactorily, partly because of problems with the studies themselves  (see, for 
example, Bakker 2010: 100; Marin 2009: 40-42; Davis 2005: 156, 158; 
Clarke/Kosec/Wallsten 2009: 328, 331). First, there is a lack of available data, 
particularly baseline information, as many water utilities lack reliable perfor-
mance monitoring (Marin 2009: 41; Bakker 2010: 100; Clarke/Kosec/Wallsten 
2009: 328, 331). Second, the ambiguity of performance indicators hampers sys-
tematic comparisons. For instance, the calculations of NRW levels or coverage 
rates vary from utility to utility. Third, the interdependency and interaction of 
different performance indicators confound comparison. It is rather meaningless, 
for example, to analyse increased access to water without considering service 
interruptions (Marin 2009: 40; Pérard 2009: 197). Here, the diverging choice of 
indicators may result in contradictory evaluations of the same cases. While one 
study may observe enhanced coverage rates, another study of the same case 
might report unaffordable tariff levels (Bakker 2010: 6; Marin 2009: 14). Fourth, 
the varying performances of different water utilities are hard to compare be-
cause they are largely shaped by local factors, such as the origin and quality of 
raw water (Marin 2009: 40). Fifth, there are several methodological difficulties 
(Bakker 2010: 100; Davis 2005: 158). Before-after comparisons entail uncertain 
assumptions about the potential development of continued public services (Da-
vis 2005: 158). In addition, a sample selection bias can be observed, meaning 
that some single-case studies have received far more attention than others. 
Econometric studies often do not include enough cases to control effectively for 
exogenous factors (Marin 2009: 42). Sixth, a considerable share of the empirical 
research is conducted or financed by organisations either supporting or oppos-
ing PSP in the water sector, resulting in arguably less independent studies (Da-
vis 2005: 156; Bakker 2010: 100). 
Despite these limitations, the body of literature which studies the perfor-
mance of PSP in the water sector can be divided into two categories: (i) case 
studies of single projects; and (ii) statistical analyses of numerous projects. The 
latter either compare the performance level of privately with publicly operated 
utilities, or the performance of different forms of private water supply before 
and after the introduction of PSP. To point out just a few examples, Clarke, 
Kosec and Wallsten show that coverage rates in three Latin American countries 
improved after the introduction of PSP. However, the same holds true for their 
control regions, including publicly operated utilities, where connection rates 
were also enhanced (Clarke/Kosec/Wallsten 2009). Similarly, Estache and Rossi 
and Kirkpatric, Parker and Zhang find no significant variation in performance 
levels of publicly and privately operated utilities in a comparison of these in 
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Asia/the Pacific and Africa respectively (Estache/Rossi 2002; Kirk-
patric/Parker/Zhang 2006). Gassner, Popov and Pushak report rather positive 
results in an extensive study of water and electricity utilities in 71 different 
countries, including larger gains in labour productivity and connection rates for 
the privately operated utilities (Gassner/Popov/Pushak 2009). However, their 
results remain inconclusive with regard to tariff increases. Moreover, an analy-
sis of various public and private water utilities in Argentina demonstrates that 
child mortality was reduced by 8 per cent in regions with PSP in the water sec-
tor (Galiani/Gertler/Schargrodsky 2005). In contrast, Guasch puts forward more 
negative results in a comprehensive analysis of a World Bank database on infra-
structure PPPs, in which he highlights that about 75 per cent of contracts in the 
water sector have either been renegotiated or cancelled altogether in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Guasch 2004).  
Case studies of single water utilities usually investigate how the perfor-
mance of the water sector develops after the introduction of PSP. These single 
case studies again present a mixed picture, although there is stronger evidence 
for improved water service delivery involving the private sector (Marin 2009: 
42; Davis 2005: 160). Accordingly, most cases observe ameliorated performance 
especially with regard to measures of coverage, productivity as well as water 
and service quality. However, these improvements often went hand in hand 
with price increases (Marin 2009: 42; Davis 2005: 166; Clarke/Kosec/Wallsten 
2009: 331). At the same time, a series of high-profile contract terminations were 
reported in recent years (Marin 2009: 13; Wu/Malaluan 2008: 208).3  
In addition, some studies mix the two categories, meaning that they com-
pare results from numerous utilities without formal statistical analysis. Instead, 
they employ similar methodologies to examine a number of different cases so 
that the results can be better compared. For example, Marin evaluates the per-
formance of 65 different urban water utilities before and after the introduction 
of PSP (Marin 2009). The study concludes that contractual agreements which 
combine private operation with public financing are the most successful. In 
other words, the initial focus on long-term contracts, including large-scale pri-
vate capital investment, has not been successful. However, the study illustrates 
that the private sector positively contributes to service quality and operational 
efficiency (Marin 2009: 123-127; 145-148). Shirley again presents contrasting 
results for six water utilities including PSP (Shirley 2002). Based on their case 
studies, Shirley and Ménard conclude that PSP in the water sector may com-
pensate for weak institutional capacities. However, they acknowledge that there 
is a danger of private operators taking advantage of these weak institutions, 
possibly resulting in arbitrary tariff increases (Shirley/Ménard 2002: 37-38). 
As with the conceptual debate, it is clear that most of the empirical studies 
also remain largely inconclusive (Marin 2009: 42; Bakker 2010: 102; 
Wu/Malaluan 2008: 208-209). Given the importance of improving water service 
                                                          
3  For a good overview of the effects of PSP on performance levels in the water 
sector, based on single case studies, see Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2009: 
332-334). 
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delivery on a global scale, it is essential to move beyond the public versus pri-
vate debate. Why is private participation in the water sector successful in some 
cases and not in others?  
2.3 Beyond public versus private: conditions for success and 
failure 
Before turning to the theory of TCE as a possible analytical framework to ex-
plain the success and failure of PSP in the water sector, this section will first 
address contributing factors which have already been put forward in the litera-
ture. Various authors have identified five main factors contributing to the suc-
cess and failure of PSP. First, there is a rather broad consensus that weak regu-
lation of the water sector results in poor performance levels of publicly and 
privately operated utilities (see, for example, Bakker 2010: 101; Johnstone/Wood 
2001: 13; Marin 2009; Franceys/Gerlach 2008; World Bank 2006; OECD 2009; 
Guasch/Laffont/Staub 2008). As mentioned above, private operators in particu-
lar tend to take advantage of weak regulation to generate profits from tariff 
increases rather than from efficiency gains (Marin 2009: 124). Despite the broad 
agreement on the general need for regulation to ensure adequate water quality, 
to avoid environmental degradation and to oversee a monopoly provider 
(Franceys/Gerlach 2008), there is no consensus as to which is the most effective 
regulatory approach. Generally, there are two different regulatory strategies, 
namely regulation by contract and regulation by an independent regulator. 
Differing contexts determine their relative advantages, depending on contract 
enforcement possibilities in court versus the capacities of a regulatory authority 
(Davis 2005: 172; Marin 2009: 131-132). More specifically, economic regulation 
entails three types of regulation, namely price-cap regulation, rate-of-return 
regulation and benchmark regulation. All three types have their advantages, 
including incentivising cost minimisation and increased private-capital ex-
penditure as well as improved handling of information asymmetries. However, 
they also involve disadvantages, such as potentially higher capital costs, risk of 
over-investment and difficulties with regard to their practical application (Da-
vis 2005: 173; Guasch/Laffont/Straub 2008: 436).  
The second condition for the success or failure of PSP in the water sector, 
which remains uncontested in the literature, is the importance of a contract with 
clear and realistic goals, as it allows to hold operators accountable more easily 
(Marin 2009: 127-128; Hailu/Guerreiro Osório/Tsukada 2012: 2576). Third, then, 
the general public should be able to scrutinise the bidding process and contract 
targets as well as regulatory information and decisions in order to enhance 
transparency and thus increase public support for PSP in the water sector (Mar-
in 2009: 133; Hailu/Guerreiro Osório/Tsukada 2012: 2576; Neville 2011: 264-265). 
This may also allow more flexible contract re-negotiations, so as to reach com-
promises and solutions, especially when facing a crisis (Neville 2011).  
Fourth, in addition to adequate contract design and regulation as major pre-
conditions, Wu and Malaluan (2008) highlight the significance of internal fac-
tors. Sound corporate governance, financial management and operations man-
agement proved to be critical factors in their study of the two water concessions 
in Metro Manila. The concluding section will consider these factors in more 
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detail. Fifth, with regard to external factors, the introduction of PSP in the water 
sector needs to be part of a broader sector reform which credibly supports fi-
nancial viability, for example through sustainable and socially acceptable cost-
covering tariffs and accountability (Marin 2009: 127). Furthermore, Guasch, 
Laffont and Straub find political cycles and macroeconomic shocks to be highly 
significant in determining renegotiations of contracts (Guasch/Laffont/Straub 
2008: 433-434). Unfortunately, the latter external factors often lie outside the 
control of the public or private operator (Marin 2009: 127). 
The following analysis in light of the theory of TCE will contribute to this 
discussion of the factors determining the success or failure of PSP in the water 
sector. The two water concessions in Metro Manila serve as instructive case 
studies in this context. Before the theory of TCE is outlined in more detail, the 
next section will first give a short overview of the two water utilities in Metro 
Manila in order to demonstrate why they form an interesting empirical puzzle. 
The case selection is also elucidated from a methodological perspective. 
3. The two water utilities in Metro Manila 
3.1 Overview of the two water utilities in Metro Manila 
In 1994, the government of the Philippines began to conceptualise the privatisa-
tion of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) in order to 
address the growing ‘water crisis’ in Metro Manila. MWSS’s failure to operate 
the water utility effectively and efficiently exemplified the crisis (ADB 2008b). 
About one-third of MWSS’s coverage population did not have access to water 
and NRW levels fluctuated by around 60 per cent at the time of privatisation 
(Dumol 2000: 6). Compared with the performance of water utilities in other 
large Asian cities, MWSS’s performance was the worst, as illustrated in Table 2. 
In addition, MWSS was immensely indebted and relied heavily on Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA) to finance capital expenditure (Esguerra 2003: 6; 
Dumol 2000: 25). 
 
Table 2: Comparison of water utilities in Asian cities, 1995 
City Population 
(million) 
Water Cov-
erage (% of 
population) 
Water Avail-
ability 
(hours/day) 
NRW (% 
of produc-
tion) 
Staff/1000 
Connec-
tions 
Manila 10.6 67 17 58 9.8 
Bangkok 7.3 82 24 38 4.6 
Hong 
Kong 
6.3 100 24 36 2.8 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
1.4 100 24 36 1.1 
Seoul 10.6 100 24 35 2.3 
Source: adapted from McIntosh/Yngiguez 1997 
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In 1995, the Philippine government adopted the Water Crisis Act which became 
the legal basis for the introduction of PSP in Metro Manila’s water sector 
(Dumol 2000: 26). The privatisation process concluded on August 1, 1997. 
MWSS’s operational and investment functions were privatised under two sepa-
rate 25-year concession agreements following a competitive bidding process 
(ADB 2008b: i). The service area of Metro Manila was divided into two zones. 
This division was a critical feature of the privatisation process because it sup-
posedly created quasi-competition between the two concessionaires, so that 
both the regulatory office and consumers have been able to compare service 
quality (Dumol 2000: 45). The Manila Water Company, Inc. (MWCI), a consorti-
um composed of International Water (United Utilities, UK and Bechtel, USA) 
and the local Ayala Corporation, won the East Zone concession (Dumol 2000: 
84). In March 2005, MWCI became a publicly listed company on the Philippine 
Stock Exchange (MWCI 2008: 7; Wastewater Headline Manager, interview, 
07/09/2011). Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI), a consortium of the interna-
tional Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and the local Benpres Holdings, won the West 
Zone concession. However, after two major crises and a long financial struggle, 
MWSI underwent a change of ownership in 2007. The DMCI-MPIC Water 
Company, a joint venture between DM Consunji, Inc. (DMCI) and Metro Pacific 
Investments Corporation (MPIC), both local companies, now manages MWSI 
(Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 1). The two service areas are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Water concession service areas in Metro Manila 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 1 
 
Considering the size of the population of about 10.6 million in the two service 
areas, equalling 13 per cent of the total population of the Philippines, and in-
vestment requirements estimated at $7 billion over the contract duration, it is 
no surprise that “the transaction was hailed as the largest water concession in 
the world” (Dumol 2000: vii).4 The sheer dimension of the transaction in one of 
the largest urban areas in Southeast Asia is in itself enough to turn the two con-
cessions into two fascinating empirical cases. Interestingly, both cases also con-
firm the inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence with regard to the perfor-
mance of PSP in the water sector outlined in Section 2.2. MWCI proved to be 
                                                          
4  For a detailed description of the privatisation process, see Dumol (2000). 
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quite successful in ameliorating water service quality in the East Zone conces-
sion, while MWSI has faced huge difficulties in the West Zone concession. This 
empirical puzzle of why the performance levels are so different makes the cases 
worth analysing. 
Besides being interesting empirical examples, the two case studies also offer 
the unique opportunity to apply a most-similar case approach to analyse the 
underlying factors for success and failure. The following section will explain 
this in more detail. 
3.2 Case selection – a most-similar case approach 
In its purest form, the most-similar system approach implies that “the chosen 
pair of cases is similar in all respects except the variable(s) of interest” (Gerring 
2007: 131, italics in original). This allows controlling for certain, concomitant 
variables, while other independent variables can be considered explanatory 
(Tarrow 2010: 234; Meckstroth 1975: 133). In other words, the method has the 
advantage of being able to dismiss a number of potentially explanatory varia-
bles from further analysis (Anckar 2008: 400). Hence, the more similar the cases 
are, except for the variables of interest, the higher the validity of the analysis. 
The two water concessions in Metro Manila are arguably most similar, as 
both concessions are implemented in a very similar context. Starting with the 
explanatory factors for the success and failure of PSP in the water sector out-
lined in Section 2.3, first, both water concessionaires in Metro Manila are subject 
to the same regulatory framework. This framework comprises a mixture of rate-
of-return regulation and benchmark regulation. Accordingly, the concession 
agreements stipulate that tariffs should allow the recovery of all investments 
over the life of the concessions plus a rate of return if capital expenditures are 
considered prudent and efficient by the public partner. Hence, risky over-
investments should be avoided (MWSS/MWCI 1997: Article 9; MWSS/MWSI 
1997: Article 9; Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 
11/10/2011; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). In 2002, the MWSS Regulatory 
Office (MWSS-RO) introduced benchmark regulation, including key perfor-
mance indicators and business efficiency measures, in order to monitor the 
concessionaires in a more efficient and accountable way (Manager, interview, 
05/09/2011). Additionally, tariff levels are adjusted according to three proce-
dures which are (i) annual inflation adjustments; (ii) annual Extraordinary Price 
Adjustments (EPA); and (iii) a so-called rate rebasing, implemented every five 
years. 
Second, besides being regulated in the same way, the contracts, namely the 
concession agreements between the two private concessionaires and the public 
partner MWSS, stipulate the same goals, responsibilities and obligations with 
regard to both the public and the private partners (MWSS/MWCI 1997; 
MWSS/MWSI 1997; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). While MWSS retained the 
ownership of its assets, MWCI and MWSI have the exclusive right to manage, 
maintain and develop the water and sewerage system (ADB 2008b: 8; Manag-
er/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011). Next to 
specifying the obligations of the private partners to provide water and sanita-
tion services, the agreements also stipulate the payment of concession fees 
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equating to MWSS’s foreign denominated debts (MWSS/MWCI 1997: Articles 5-
6; MWSS/MWSI 1997: Articles 5-6). However, here lies one of the differences in 
the agreements. While MWCI only has to pay 10 per cent of MWSS’s former 
loans in the form of concession fees, MWSI is obliged to pay 90 per cent. This 
factor will be further considered in the analysis.  
Third, the general public was and continues to be able to scrutinise the same 
information about both concessionaires with regard to the bidding process as 
well as regulatory information and decisions of the MWSS-RO, for instance in 
relation to tariffs. For example, during the bidding process, it was considered 
essential to have bids lower than the pre-privatisation tariff levels in both con-
cession areas in order to win public support (Dumol 2000: 42). 
Fourth, with regard to external factors, both concessionaires faced similar 
framework conditions. As mentioned in the previous section, the Water Crisis 
Act formed the legal basis for the reform of the water sector in Metro Manila, 
including the introduction of PSP and other elements, such as a re-organisation 
of MWSS (Dumol 2000: 25-26). Furthermore, both concessionaires are obviously 
confronted with the same political cycles, as the local government of Metro 
Manila as well as the central government are identical in both concession areas. 
Similarly, external (macro-economic shocks), most prominently the Asian fi-
nancial crisis and the rather severe incidence of the weather phenomenon El 
Niño, which reduced water availability by about 30 per cent, hit both conces-
sionaires (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 215; Neville 2011: 246).  
Despite these similar framework conditions, the performance of the two 
concessionaires varies immensely, with the East Zone concessionaire being the 
success story and the West Zone concessionaire facing huge difficulties. The 
two cases thus exemplify variations in the dependent variable, namely the per-
formance level of the two concessionaires, while possible explanatory variables, 
including most of those pointed out in Section 2.3, remain constant. As a conse-
quence, the two cases allow contingent causal inferences to be drawn about the 
actual underlying explanatory variables (Kaarbo/Beasley 1999: 381-382). The 
question, then, is: Why do the two cases immensely vary in their performance 
levels? What are the explanatory independent variables for one concessionaire’s 
success and the other’s failure? Before turning to a possible theoretical explana-
tion based on TCE, the following section will elaborate on the concessionaires’ 
differing performance levels. 
3.3 Performance levels of the two water utilities in Metro Manila 
Four indicators will provide information about the performance levels of water 
service provision in the East and West Zone concessions. First, an analysis of 
the changing levels of access to water services reveals the performance level. 
Second, the study will examine to what extent the concessionaires reduced wa-
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ter rationing. Third, the reduction of NRW levels5 serves as an indicator to 
evaluate service provision. The last indicator relates to the tariff levels with 
regard to their financial viability as well as affordability. These indicators were 
purposely selected, as they include the provisions for water service delivery as 
stipulated in the concession agreements (MWSS/MWCI 1997; MWSS/MWSI 
1997 Article 5, Schedule 2). They also form the main basis of MWSS-RO’s moni-
toring and evaluation of the two concessionaries with regard to key perfor-
mance indicators and business efficiency measures, which have formed part of 
the benchmark regulation since 2002. Additionally, Marin (2009) uses them in 
the aforementioned analysis of 65 urban water utilities. 
3.3.1 Performance levels in the East Zone concession  
Using the four indicators, the study will first analyse to what extent the East 
Zone concessionaire has been able to increase access to water services during 
the contract term. Table 3 summarises the service targets for water supply cov-
erage as laid down in the concession agreement as well as the actual water sup-
ply coverage.  
 
Table 3: Water supply coverage in the East Zone of Metro Manila 
 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 
Water supply coverage targets 77.1% 94.1% 94.1% 94.1% 94.6% 
Actual water supply coverage 76% 98% 99%   
Source: MWSS/MWCI 1997: Schedule 2; MWSS 2013a 
 
MWCI estimates that it currently provides water to more than six million peo-
ple, implying that about 99 per cent of the service population has access to wa-
ter (MWCI 2010: 6; MWSS 2013a; Manager/Research and Planning Executive 
Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011). It is obvious that MWCI has surpassed the 
initial contractual targets of 94.1 per cent. Therefore, performance with regard 
to this indicator is arguably high. Certainly, performance has improved com-
pared to pre-privatisation levels when only 67 per cent of the population had 
access to water. MWCI mainly achieved this high performance with the help of 
an innovative programme, called Tubig Para Sa Barangay (Water for the Com-
munity) with which the company was also able to supply safe water to low-
income communities (Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, 
interview, 11/10/2011). This demonstrates that equity considerations were in-
cluded by the private partner, which not only supports poor households, but 
also helps to increase public acceptance of the concessionaire.  
                                                          
5  NRW refers to water that is not billed because of leakages in the distribution 
network (physical losses) as well as illegal connections or measurement 
problems due to dysfunctional meters (commercial losses). 
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Second, the concession agreement envisions that “the Concessionaire shall 
ensure the availability of an uninterrupted 24 hour supply of water to all con-
nected Customers in the Service Area”(MWSS/MWCI 1997: Article 5.1.2). 
MWCI successfully achieved this target and 99 per cent of the service popula-
tion receives water on a 24-hour basis (MWCI 2011: 53). Hence, the performance 
level with regard to this indicator can also be considered high after the privati-
sation. In contrast, the performance before the implementation of the concession 
was much inferior, as MWSS supplied water on average for only 16 hours per 
day (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 212). Low continuity of service puts considerable con-
straints on households, who might be forced to store or fetch water from other 
supplies in order to bridge the intermittent supply.  
Third, Figure 2 presents the development of NRW over the concession peri-
od up until today. The figure includes the bid forecast representing the initial 
targets of the concession agreement. The rate-rebasing (RR) forecast is also in-
cluded. These new targets were adopted in 2003, when it was realised that the 
initial targets set in the concession agreement could not be met. Lastly, the fig-
ure incorporates the actual performance of MWCI.  
 
Figure 2: Development of NRW in the East Zone over the concession period 
 
Source: MWSS-RO 2010a; MWCI 2011: 6, 53 
 
As illustrated, the company failed to meet the initial contractual targets and in 
the first years of the concessions, NRW levels actually increased. This exempli-
fies the reduced possibility for capital expenditure after the Asian financial cri-
sis which Sections 5.1.3 and 5.3.3 will discuss in more detail. However, from 
2003 onwards, MWCI gradually reduced NRW levels to 11 per cent (MWCI 
2011: 6, 53). In 2009, the concessionaire accomplished and surpassed the initially 
envisioned targets as laid down in the bid forecast (MWSS-RO 2010a). A NRW 
level of 11 per cent is arguably high-performing, particularly for a developing 
country, as it is comparable to those of the best-performing utilities in indus-
trialised countries. In contrast, before the privatisation, the NRW level fluctuat-
ed at around 60 per cent in both service areas taken together (McIntosh/Yniguez 
1997; Dumol 2000). This level is even worse than average in developing coun-
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tries, where NRW levels are estimated at around 40 to 50 per cent (King-
dom/Liemberger/Marin 2006: 2). 
 
The last indicator to assess the performance level relates to the tariff levels. 
In order to ensure a utility’s financial sustainability, tariff levels must be cost-
covering. Simultaneously, they have to remain affordable, meaning that tariffs 
should not exceed 3 per cent of per capita income (Hailu/Guerreiro Osó-
rio/Tsukada 2009: 11). In relation to MWCI, ever since the implementation of 
the privatisation, tariff levels are assumed to be cost-covering, as they allow the 
concessionaires to recover their capital expenditure plus achieve a rate of return 
over the life of the concession (Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). Before the pri-
vatisation, this was not the case, as MWSS largely relied on subsidies from the 
central government and on ODA (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 207-209; Dumol 2000: 19). 
The tariffs have remained affordable before and after privatisation, as they, 
according to two of the interviewees, they do not exceed the 3 per cent level of 
per capita income (Manager, MWSS-RO, interview, 05/09/2011; 
Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011). 
Since it is not possible to verify these statements due to a lack of data, the study 
alternatively analyses whether tariff structures and pro-poor programmes sup-
port low-income households. Accordingly, before privatisation, there was a 
lower tariff level as well as a tariff structure that benefited low-income 
households (Rosenthal 2002; Manager/Research and Planning Executive 
Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). After privati-
sation, the tariff structure has continued to differentiate between customers, 
with residential customers paying the lowest rates, commercial customers being 
charged the second highest rates and industrial customers paying the most. 
Moreover, there is an increasing block tariff policy, meaning that the rates per 
unit for water rise with total consumption. This supports low-income house-
holds further, as low consumption is assumed to be linked with lower income 
(Rosenthal 2002).  
MWCI has also been able to connect low-income households to the distribu-
tion system with the help of the aforementioned community programme Tubig 
Para Sa Barangay. Accordingly, low-income households are able to benefit from 
the tariff structure (MWCI 2011: 5, 11; Manager/Research and Planning Execu-
tive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011). The concessionaire tries to alleviate pay-
ment requirements for poor households with the help of flexible financing 
schemes, such as the staggered payment of connection fees and cost-sharing 
arrangements among community members (Baclagon 2004: 14; Wu/Malaluan 
2008: 222). The increasing block tariff structure seems to be a challenge because 
most low-income communities receive water in bulk, implying an excess con-
sumption beyond ten cubic metres which is charged at a higher rate (Rosenthal 
2002). However, MWCI tried to offset this by calculating an average consump-
tion for each individual community household which is charged at a lower rate. 
Still, the social scheme results in higher rates for low-income households com-
pared with an average household directly connected to the water infrastructure 
(Baclagon 2004: 19). Despite this challenge, the community project is certainly 
an innovative strategy by the private partner to reach low-income-households. 
As mentioned, it demonstrates that equitable distribution patterns are account-
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ed for in the East Zone concession. Now, poor households are also able to bene-
fit from the central water distribution system and do not have to rely on water 
vendors whose services are often as much as ten times more expensive (Bac-
lagon 2004: 10). Accordingly, with regard to tariff levels, performance is at a 
high level since the introduction of PSP. Tariffs are both cost-covering and 
seemingly affordable due to a pro-poor tariff structure and a functioning pro-
poor programme. In contrast, the previous performance level was only moder-
ate, as tariffs were not cost-covering but arguably affordable. 
3.3.2 Performance levels in the West Zone concession  
In the following, the contrasting performance of the West Zone concession as 
compared to the East Zone concession will become visible. Again, first, the 
study evaluates the performance level in the West Zone concession by assessing 
to what extent MWSI increased access to water services. Table 4 sums up the 
service targets for water supply coverage as laid down in the concession 
agreement as well as the actual water supply coverage. Although the company 
increased access to water services after the implementation of the concession 
from 67 per cent to 85 per cent in 2011, the coverage targets envisioned in the 
concession agreement have still not been met (MWSS 2013a; MWSS/MWSI 1997: 
Schedule 2). Between 2001 and 2006, the increase in supply coverage nearly 
stagnated, exemplifying the reduced possibility for capital expenditure after the 
Asian financial crisis as well as quite obstructive re-negotiations (Marin 2009: 
56). Unlike in the East Zone concession, where universal access has nearly been 
achieved, it is not clear who benefits most from the increased access in the West 
Zone concession. The community programme, which was initiated by MWSI, 
largely failed. Accordingly, before and after the implementation of the conces-
sion, the performance in the West Zone service area, measured against the first 
indicator, remains unsatisfactory.  
 
Table 4: Water supply coverage in the West Zone of Metro Manila 
 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 
Water supply coverage targets 87.4 % 97.1 % 97.4 % 97.7 % 98.4 % 
Actual water supply coverage 73 % 74 % 85 %   
Source: UTCE/Japan PFI Association 2003: 29; Marin 2009: 56; MWSS 2013a  
 
The second indicator to assess the performance level again relates to water ra-
tioning. As mentioned, before privatisation, MWSS supplied water only for 16 
hours per day on average, which put constraints on households (Wu/Malaluan 
2008: 212). After the implementation of the concession, MWSI reduced water 
rationing at first. However, the situation significantly deteriorated as soon as 
the company faced the previously mentioned immense financial difficulties 
after the Asian financial crisis. In 2006, only 32 per cent of MWSI’s customers 
had 24-hour supply as compared to 80 per cent in 2001 (Marin 2009: 71; MWSI 
2011). After the change of ownership in 2008, MWSI slowly reduced water ra-
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tioning again, so that in 2010, 71 per cent of customers received 24-hour water 
supply (MWSI 2010: 3). Since 2011, the concessionaire reached the initial level of 
about 80 per cent again (MWSI 2011). Hence, especially at the start of privatisa-
tion, performance levels were even poorer than those of the public utility.  
Third, Figure 3 presents the development of NRW in the West Zone over the 
concession period. It again includes the bid forecast representing the initial 
targets of the concession agreement. The rate-rebasing (RR) forecast is also in-
cluded. MWSS adopted these new targets in 2004, when they realised that the 
initial targets set out in the concession agreement could not be met. Lastly, the 
figure incorporates the actual performance of MWSI.  
 
Figure 3: Development of NRW in the West Zone over the concession period 
 
Source: MWSS-RO 2010b; Dimaano 2012  
 
As is obvious, MWSI did not achieve the initial targets (bid forecast) set out in 
the concession agreements over the term of the concession. In the first few 
years, the NRW level increased to as much as 69 per cent between 1999 and 
2004 as compared to a fluctuating value of about 60 per cent in both service 
areas before privatisation (UTCE/Japan PFI Association 2003: 34). Moreover, 
MWSI did not meet the new forecasts set after the rate-rebasing (RR) in 2004, 
but exceeded them in all years except for one. A NRW value above 60 per cent 
is even worse than the average in developing countries, where NRW levels are 
estimated at around 40 to 50 per cent (Kingdom/Liemberger/Marin 2006: 2). 
Since the change of ownership, NRW levels have slowly started to fall again 
(MWSS-RO 2010b; Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). Thus, perfor-
mance with regard to this indicator has been unsatisfactory before and after the 
implementation of the concession.  
Fourth, the financial sustainability and affordability of the tariff levels will 
help to assess performance level. As mentioned above, tariff levels before the 
privatisation were not cost-covering, as MWSS largely relied on subsidies from 
the central government as well as ODA (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 207-209; Dumol 
2000: 19). Similar to tariff levels in the East Zone, tariff levels in the West Zone 
concession allow MWSI to recover its capital expenditure plus achieve a rate of 
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return over the life of the concession (Manager, interview, 05/09/2011; Chief 
Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). They are therefore are supposedly cost-
covering. As stated in the previous section, the tariff levels were assumingly 
assumed to be affordable prior to the privatisation due to much lower tariff 
levels as well as a tariff structure that benefits low-income households 
(Rosenthal 2002; Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, 
interview, 11/10/2011; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). After the 
implementation of the concession, the West Zone concessionaire adopted a 
similar tariff structure to that in the East Zone concession, including an 
increasing block tariff and differentiation between customers. However, since 
then, the tariff levels increased by as much as 250 per cent compared to the pre-
PPP level (Marin 2009: 114). Some studies show that tariffs presently charged by 
MWSI are higher than those that would apply if the service had remained in 
public hands (Marin 2009: 115-116). Unlike MWCI, MWSI’s water for the 
community project, which targeted poor households, largely failed because it 
created additional financial burdens due to rising NRW levels after the 
programme began to expand (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 224; UTCE/Japan PFI 
Association 2003: 68-69). In sum, performance with regard to tariff levels has 
remained inadequate before and after privatisation. Before, tariff levels were 
not cost-covering, but arguably affordable. Afterwards, tariff levels were cost-
covering, but no definite statement can be made about their affordability. 
Although the tariff structure benefits low-income customers, large tariff 
increases were put in place and the pro-poor programme initially envisioned 
arguably failed. 
Summing up, the performance of service provision in the water sector has 
improved since the implementation of the concession in the East Zone of Metro 
Manila, especially compared to the situation before privatisation. In the West 
Zone concession, the scenario is reversed. After the introduction of the PPP, 
performance did not significantly improve and partially even deteriorated. 
Thus, the performance level is even poorer compared to service quality prior to 
privatision. How can this large difference in performance levels in the East and 
West Zone be explained?  
 
4. TCE and privatisation in the water sector 
Having the large differences in the performance levels of the East Zone and 
West Zone concessionaires in mind, this section will consider the theory of TCE 
in more detail. TCE, being rooted in New Institutional Economics (NIE)6, focus-
es on the analysis of economic activity in relation to governance structures 
which vary in their organisational competences (Williamson 2005: 51). Transac-
tions, i.e. economic exchanges implying the transfer of associated property 
                                                          
6  For more information on various strands in NIE, see, for example, Ménard 
and Shirley (2005). 
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rights, for example in form of a privatisation, are the basic unit of analysis. Im-
plicit or explicit contracts between two or more partners are the basis of transac-
tions. They involve costs which arise as a result of negotiating, monitoring and 
enforcing contracts. These contracts are assumed to be incomplete due to the 
human characteristic of bounded rationality, namely the incapability of actors 
to foresee all future contingencies. As a consequence, not every possible state of 
nature can be specified in the transaction contract, which means that external 
enforcement might be difficult. Ex post transaction costs may arise due to op-
portunistic behaviour of one or both contracting parties. In other words, trans-
action costs may involve contractual hazards, such as mal-adaptation costs, 
costs of modifying, enforcing or reneging on a contract, costs that arise in rela-
tion to  protection against ex post opportunism (Williamson 2005: 46-48).  
As the interdependency of contracting partners and, thus, transaction costs 
rise, the need for contractual safeguards and control mechanisms for fulfilment 
of obligations ex post increases. In order to provide these contractual safeguards, 
TCE argues that economic actors align “transactions, which differ in their at-
tributes, [to] governance structures, which differ in their costs and competen-
cies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way” (William-
son 1991: 277). Accordingly, governance is the means by which to introduce 
safeguards and order so as to mitigate conflicts and realise mutual gain. In rela-
tion to this, Williamson differentiates between three types of governance struc-
tures, namely markets, hierarchies and hybrids (Williamson 2005).  
4.1 Governance structures – markets, hierarchies and hybrids 
Generally, the three governance structures – market, hierarchies and hybrids – 
differ in three main characteristics, namely incentive intensity, administrative 
control and bureaucracy, and contract law regime (Williamson 2005). In the first 
type of governance structure, namely markets, the risk of exchange hazards is 
low and contracting works well as the interdependency of the contracting par-
ties is basically non-existent. In other words, transaction partners can easily be 
exchanged. Since information is readily available through price mechanisms 
and competition, contracts are nearly complete so that economic actors adapt 
efficiently to disturbances and varying circumstances (Williamson 1991: 279). In 
this situation, market governance incurs the lowest costs, as incentives intensi-
ty, meaning the incentive to allocate resources efficiently, is very high. Admin-
istrative controls are low because supporting bureaucratic structures are nearly 
non-existent and not needed. The contract law regime is legalistic, i.e. the courts 
can solve disputes, as nearly complete contracts are easily enforceable (William-
son 2005: 48-51).  
When exchange hazards and the interdependency of the contracting parties 
are high, hierarchy entails the lowest costs. This type of governance structure 
enables contracting partners to easily coordinate adaptation to unanticipated 
changes in the environment, as they are organised within one unified authority. 
Hence, information exchange is facilitated and disputes over incomplete con-
tracts are settled within the organisation, implying that it is the court of ulti-
mate appeal (Williamson 1991: 274). However, moving a transaction from mar-
kets to hierarchies involves costs. Incentives are diminished as a result of inter-
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nal organisation and consequential low competition. Moreover, bureaucratic 
costs rise because extensive administrative control mechanisms have to be in-
troduced. Because of these costs, hierarchical organisation can be thought of as 
the governance structure of last resort (Williamson 2005: 53).  
The last type of governance structure, hybrids, is located in between the 
characteristics of incentive intensity, administrative support by bureaucracy 
and contract law regime. In cases where a transaction involves only moderate 
interdependency of the contracting parties and the possibility of exchange haz-
ards, hybrids are the governance structures with least costs. The autonomy of 
the contracting parties is at least partially maintained, so that incentive intensity 
is at a medium level. At the same time, the contractual framework provides for 
additional safeguards and administrative control. Information disclosure is 
facilitated and arbitration mechanisms replace the courts. Nevertheless, con-
tracting parties can still revert to the courts as medium of ultimate (Ox-
ley/Silverman 2008: 217-218). Table 5 summarises the attributes of the three 
different governance structures. 
 
Table 5: Attributes of governance structures 
          Governance  
                     structure 
 Attributes    
Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Incentives intensity High Medium Low 
Administrative control  Low Medium High 
Contract law regime 
Legalistic 
(court) 
Contract as 
framework 
Organisation as court 
of ultimate appeal 
Source: adapted from Williamson 2005: 49 
 
The discrete numbers of three different governance structures do not always 
clearly represent the ‘real-world’ organisational forms of public water provi-
sion, PPPs and private water services. Nevertheless, hierarchy relatively clearly 
epitomises publicly run utilities. Most PPPs, such as management and lease 
contracts, may safely be assigned to hybrids. The border between markets and 
hybrids becomes more blurred when looking at concessions. These are arguably 
on the edge of full privatisation, implying market governance, but retain some 
characteristics of hybrids, such as public asset ownership. A divesture repre-
sents market governance in the provision of water services. Having these dif-
ferent governance structures in mind, the question is what determines the level 
of transaction costs and the resulting threats of contractual hazards.  
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4.2 The characteristics of transactions – asset specificity and 
uncertainty 
The characteristics of transactions, namely asset specificity and uncertainty7, 
influence the level of transaction costs. An asset is specific if it makes a neces-
sary contribution to the production of a good or service and has much lower 
value in alternative uses. This non-redeployable character of investments exists, 
for example, due to their localisation (site specificity), their physical characteris-
tics (physical specificity), the size of the market (dedicated assets), necessary 
specialised knowledge (human specificity) or the synchronisation needed (tem-
poral specificity). Investment in a specific asset increases the dependency of the 
investing party, which heightens the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the 
non-investing party (Williamson 1996; Joskow 2005: 327-228).  
As asset specificity and, hence, bilateral dependency rise the aforementioned 
contractual hazards may set in. In order to avoid these hazards and economise 
transaction costs, economic actors align transactions to governance structures, 
depending on the level of asset specificity (Williamson 2005: 51). Figure 4 illus-
trates this, whereby ‘k’ represents the level of asset specificity and ‘$’ the level 
of transaction costs. A lack of incentive intensity and higher administrative 
costs (k=0) initially disadvantages hierarchies (H(k)) and hybrids (X(k)). How-
ever, the divergence of costs between markets (M(k)), hierarchies (H(k)) and 
hybrids (X(k)) decreases as asset specificity (k) increases. Eventually they turn 
around, as the need for contractual safeguards, coordination and administrative 
control becomes particularly immense (Williamson 2005: 51-52). 
 
Figure 4: Transaction costs and asset specificity 
 
Source: Williamson 2005: 49 
                                                          
7  The third characteristic, frequency, will not be dealt with because of the un-
clear and partly competing effects on transaction costs. On the one hand, 
high transaction frequency gives reasons for hierarchical organisation to 
make use of economies of scale in a recurring transaction and recover the 
costs of vertical integration. On the other hand, if reputation mechanisms are 
important, high levels of frequency drive transaction costs down, as they 
support the development of reputation effects (Macher/Richman 2008: 7). 
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Asset 
specificity 
 
This study measures the level of asset specificity in relation to water services on 
the basis of three indicators. First, the properties of raw water reveal the level of 
asset specificity, as the worse the quality, the more specific the treatment. 
Treatment requirements can range from simple mechanical filtering to more 
complicated combinations of physical and chemical treatment plus disinfection 
and refining processes (Ménard/Saussier 2000: 393). The second indicator to 
measure the level of asset specificity is the origin of raw water. Reliance on 
groundwater, as compared to surface water, implies higher asset specificity, as 
obtaining and distributing groundwater usually requires expensive and highly 
technical pumping systems (ibid.). The third indicator relates to the riskiness of 
investments. As mentioned, investments in the water sector entail high risks 
due to their large volumes, long amortisation terms and the non-redeployable 
character of assets. Nevertheless, some investments entail higher risks than 
others. Accordingly, the risk may be heightened by a poor and increasingly 
obsolete distribution system with high NRW levels. The existence of other un-
predictable hazards, such as fees, further increases the riskiness of investments.  
Uncertainty generally refers to unanticipated changes in circumstances 
surrounding a transaction, such as a privatisation process. Uncertainty is, for 
example, influenced by changes in the environment, as this increases the 
complexity of the transaction (Leiblein 2003). The higher the complexity of the 
transaction, the more difficult it is to anticipate changes in circumstances 
surrounding the exchange, implying a higher level of uncertainty 
(Ménard/Saussier 2000). As the uncertainty around the transaction increases – 
especially in connection with rising asset specificity – the need for contractual 
safeguards heightens as well (Williamson 2005: 47). Hence, contracting parties 
aim to align governance structures to the level of uncertainty and asset 
specificity, which Table 6 highlights. If asset specificity and uncertainty are low, 
for example, market governance can be chosen, whereas if both characteristics 
are at a high level, hierarchies are the best option.  
 
Table 6: Uncertainty, asset specificity and governance structures 
Uncertainty 
 
Source: own figure 
 
In order to measure the level of uncertainty in the water sector, the study puts 
forward three further indicators. First, the origin of raw water may also impact 
on uncertainty, as it determines to what extent an assessment of water availabil-
ity is possible. It is more difficult to determine the amount of groundwater as 
compared to surface water. Second, the study measures uncertainty in terms of 
 Low Medium High 
Low Market Market Market 
Medium Hybrid Hybrid or 
hierarchy 
Hybrid or 
hierarchy 
High Hybrid Hybrid or 
hierarchy 
Hierarchy 
Marie-Luise Mußenbrock 
 
28 
the availability of raw water, meaning that it assesses whether the service re-
gion is characterised by water shortages. Possible water shortages increase un-
certainty, as the utility operator cannot be sure of being able to meet minimum 
demand, for example in the event of a drought. Third, the length of the contract 
reveals the level of uncertainty. The longer the contract duration, the less com-
plete it will be because of the difficulties of including all various contingencies. 
However, do economic agents always align governance structures and transac-
tion costs in the most cost-effective way? 
4.3 (Mis)alignment of governance structures 
Misalignments occur between transaction costs and governance structures. 
Individuals, who are characterised by bounded rationality, do not always de-
cide rationally on the optimal form of governance as determined by the level of 
asset specificity and uncertainty. This misalignment may result in different 
degrees of contractual hazards and is, therefore, predicted to lead to inefficien-
cies. Each governance structure has, as mentioned above, its advantages and 
disadvantages, with the right choice depending on the characteristics of the 
transactions (Yvronde-Billon/Saussier 2004; Ménard/Saussier 2000). Hence, the 
optimal mode of governance efficiently mitigates possible contractual hazards 
and conflicts, while simultaneously keeping the incentive structure high (Wil-
liamson 2005). In relation to this, empirical studies have shown that a 
(mis)alignment has effects on the commercial success of a firm as measured by 
profit (Mayer/Nickerson 2005; Nickerson/Silverman 2004), return on sales 
(Nickerson/Silverman 2004) or survival rates of firms (Silver-
man/Nickerson/Freeman 1997). Other empirical studies scrutinise the relation-
ship between transactional (mis)alignment and performance as determined by 
technical performance (Leiblein/Reuer/Dalsace 2002) and quality of service 
(Ménard/Saussier 2000). Nevertheless, the number of studies that investigate 
the performance implications of governance choice through the lens of TCE 
remains limited (Macher/Richman 2008: 41).8 
Similar to the aforementioned studies, an alignment of governance struc-
tures in water services may thus result in fewer contractual hazards, such as re-
negotiations or terminations of contracts, and, in turn, to improved service de-
livery. In order to assess the level of contractual hazards, the study examines to 
what extent contractual re-negotiations can be observed. This reveals the extent 
to which transaction costs are economised and governance structures are 
aligned. If disputes can, for example, be settled within the framework of the 
contract, there is a low level of contractual hazards, implying functioning arbi-
                                                          
8  In contrast to this limited amount of research examining whether adherence 
to transaction cost principles is associated with enhanced performance 
(Yvronde-Billon/Saussier 2004), a larger amount of empirical research con-
sistently shows that transaction cost considerations are important drivers of 
governance choices across multiple social science disciplines and business 
fields (see Macher/Richman 2008 for an extensive review). 
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tration rules. If it comes to a complete termination of the contract, the chosen 
governance structure is assumed to have failed to economise transactions costs.  
Based on this understanding of TCE, the study hypothesises that more 
aligned governance structures (intermediary variable), according to the level of 
transaction costs (independent variable), lead to better performance of service 
provision in the water sector (dependent variable). Accordingly, the indicators 
for asset specificity and uncertainty support an assessment of the level of trans-
action costs and, together with the degree of contractual hazards, provide in-
formation about a possible alignment or misalignment of governance struc-
tures. Figure 5 presents the hypothesis and the corresponding variables more 
clearly.  
 
Figure 5: Hypothesis and Variables 
 
Source: own figure 
5. Transaction characteristics of the two water 
utilities in Metro Manila 
In order to find out whether an alignment or misalignment of governance struc-
tures according to TCE can be observed in one or both of the concessions, the 
first step is to assess the level of transaction costs with regard to asset specificity 
and uncertainty.  
5.1 Transaction characteristics of the East Zone concessionaire 
5.1.1 Asset specificity 
First, in the East Zone concession area, asset specificity, as measured by the 
properties of raw water, is arguably at a medium level. Accordingly, raw water, 
which is treated in the Balara Treatment Plant, goes through four main process-
es, namely flocculation, sedimentation, filtration and disinfection (Manag-
er/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011; MWSS 
2013b). At different times of the year, different treatment levels are necessary, 
which also impacts on costs. For instance, when it is quite rainy, soil from the 
mountains might be dislodged, making the water more turbid, so that more 
chemicals are needed (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). Neverthe-
less, the required water treatment levels are considered “normal” (Manag-
Independent variable Intermediary variable Dependent variable 
Asset specificity 
Uncertainty 
Contractual hazards 
(Mis)alignment of 
governance structure 
according to TCE 
(before-after compar-
ison) 
Performance of 
water service pro-
vision (before-after 
comparison) 
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er/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011), especially 
because the process has been used since the 1960s (ibid.). This implies that the 
concessionaire uses a rather conventional, highly tested technology. Since no 
specific investments have been needed to finance unconventional technologies 
so far, the public partner has considered all capital expenditures prudent and 
efficient, allowing the concessionaire to recover all investments plus achieve a 
rate of return (MWSS/MWCI 1997: Article 9.3.4; Manager/Research and Plan-
ning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011; 
Wastewater Headline Manager, interview, 07/09/2011). 
Second, in the concession area of MWCI, the level of asset specificity with 
regard to the origin of raw water is rather low. More than 97 per cent of it stems 
from surface water in the Angat-Ipo-La Mesa Dam Raw Water System, with the 
principal source being the Angat River. From Angat Dam water is transmitted 
to Ipo Dam which serves as an intermediate intake. The water then flows to 
three settling basins in Bicti before part of it is passed on to the Belara Treat-
ment Plant with the help of aqueducts. Hence, hardly any expensive and highly 
technical pumping systems are needed to obtain and distribute the water, as it 
flows mostly by gravity (MWSS 2013c). 
Third, the riskiness of investments further reveals the level of asset specifici-
ty. The East Zone concessionaire inherited the newer elements of MWSS’s for-
mer distribution system (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011; Public 
Servant, interview, 08/09/2011). The service area benefited from MWSS’s expan-
sion initiatives during the 1980s. Accordingly, the general network age at the 
time of privatisation ranged from ten to twenty years (Manager, email inter-
view, 05/01/2011). Depending on the material used, water pipes have an aver-
age operational lifespan of about fifty to eighty years (Palaske 2009: 293) mean-
ing that the water infrastructure of the East Zone is rather new. This, combined 
with an initial NRW value of just 45 per cent in 1997, indicates that the distribu-
tion system was presumably in reasonably good condition (MWSS-RO 2010a). 
However, the fact that MWCI had to repay 10 per cent of MWSS’s former loans 
in the form of concession fees heightens the riskiness of investment. Since these 
loans were mostly foreign denominated, they proved to be a major point of 
contention after the Asian financial crisis massively devalued the Philippine 
peso (Esguerra 2003). Nonetheless, the financial burden remained manageable, 
since MWCI only had to pay 10 per cent of MWSS’s former loans.  
5.1.2 Uncertainty 
With regard to uncertainty, first, the study examines the origin of raw water. As 
mentioned before, MWCI largely depends on surface water from the Angat-
Ipo-La Mesa Dam Raw Water System (MWSS 2013c). The availability of water 
can therefore be assessed fairly easily, so that uncertainty with regard to this 
indicator is presumed to be low.  
Second, uncertainty with regard to the availability of raw water is at a medi-
um level, as there is enough water to serve the demand for the time being. 
However, it is questionable whether it can also serve future demand by only 
relying on Angat Dam. Accordingly, the weather phenomenon El Niño, which 
sometimes drastically reduces water availability, regularly affects the raw water 
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source (ADB 2008b: 21, 56; Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 3). If this weather 
phenomenon intensifies, for example as a result of climate change, the lack of 
raw water might cause serious problems for the concessionaires in the future 
(Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011). 
Low water levels in Angat Dam also negatively impact on the quality of the 
water, so that more chemicals are needed to treat the water, driving up treat-
ment costs (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). Moreover, MWCI 
relies on a single source to meet the demand for potable water. This is quite 
risky, particularly because this one source is relatively close to an earthquake 
fault line. Both partners are therefore actively looking for new water sources. 
However, this could become a somewhat contentious issue, as it is not clear 
whose responsibility it is to develop this new source (Manager/Research and 
Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011; Manager, interview, 
05/09/2011). 
Third, the length of the contract determines the level of uncertainty. The East 
Zone concession agreement was originally set at 25 years in 1997, implying a 
rather lengthy contract duration and high uncertainty. In 2008, uncertainty fur-
ther increased due to another contract extension. The concession is now envi-
sioned to end in 2037 (Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, 
interview, 11/10/2011; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011).  
5.1.3 Contractual hazards 
The degree of contractual hazards will further verify the assessment of an 
alignment or misalignment. In the case of the concession between MWCI and 
MWSS, there has been a moderate level of contractual hazards. As indicated in 
the previous section, the devaluation of the Philippine peso after the Asian fi-
nancial crisis and the rather severe incidence of the El Niño phenomenon in 
1997 led to relatively extensive re-negotiations. The Philippine peso devalued 
against the United States dollar by more than 100 per cent by the end of 1998 
(Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 2). This, in turn, led to the doubling of the con-
cession fees in form of MWSS’s former foreign denominated loans. As a conse-
quence, MWCI filed a petition for an Extraordinary Price Adjustment (EPA) 
(Esguerra 2003: 3). Later on, MWCI and MWSS also signed Amendment Num-
ber 1, which was originally initiated by the West Zone concessionaire. It allows 
automatic tariff rate adjustments based on prevailing exchange rates for the 
remainder of the concession. Thus, the two concessionaires can neither gain nor 
lose on the basis of changing exchange rates (Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 3; 
Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 11/10/2011; 
Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). Both EPA and Amendment No. 1 were ulti-
mately the subject of a case in the Court of Appeal, i.e. outside the arbitration 
rules provided for in the concession agreement. However, a termination of the 
contract could be averted. 
The second re-negotiation concerned the extension of the concession term 
for another fifteen years. The Philippine Supreme Court mandated the clean-up 
of Manila Bay and “(w)ith this new ruling, […] it necessitated that the conces-
sionaires […] become more aggressive in implementing their wastewater mas-
ter plans” (Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 
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11/10/2011). Although this re-negotiation confirms the fairly good relations 
between MWCI and MWSS, it still demonstrates the incompleteness of the con-
tract, as the costs and complexity of sanitation services were underestimated.  
The third potential point of contention may centre on the harnessing of a 
new water source that meets the growing demand in Metro Manila. According 
to the concession agreement, MWSS was responsible for the Umiray Angat 
Transbasin Project which serves as an additional source (ADB 2004). Besides the 
development of this new water source, it is not clear whose responsibility it is to 
develop other required sources (Wastewater Headline Manager, interview, 
07/09/2011; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). According to one of the conces-
sionaires, there is “an implicit assumption in the concession agreement that 
MWSS is taking care of new water sources” (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 
02/09/2011), mainly because it will be a complicated large-scale project involv-
ing considerable investments. This arguably goes beyond the scope of obliga-
tions and responsibilities of the concessionaires, which are tasked with supply-
ing drinking water and sanitation services as stipulated in the concession 
agreement. Moreover, the costs would be passed on to the consumer if the con-
cessionaires had an obligation to develop the source because, as mentioned 
above, the concession agreement allows the concessionaire to recover all in-
vestments plus achieve a rate of return (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 
02/09/2011; Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 
11/10/2011). A more equitable financing scheme might, therefore, be achieved if 
the public partner develops the source by relying on tax revenue and possibly 
ODA. In any case, the modalities, as well as issues related to water rights and 
tariffs, remain ambiguous (Manager, interview, 05/09/2011; Public Servant, in-
terview, 08/09/2011).  
5.2 Alignment of governance structure in the East Zone 
concession 
Based on the analysis of the level of transaction costs and contractual hazards, 
the governance structure in form of a concession between MWCI and MWSS is 
arguably an alignment. In contrast, the hierarchical form of governance before 
the implementation of the concession is thus a misalignment. Figure 6 summa-
rises the levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and contractual hazards, the 
corresponding governance structure according to TCE, and the performance 
level in the East Zone concession.  
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Independent variable Intermediary variable Dependent variable 
Asset specificity: 
Low to medium 
Uncertainty: 
Medium 
Before: Misalignment 
of governance struc-
ture  hierarchy 
(public service) 
After: Alignment of 
governance structure 
 market/hybrid 
(concession) 
Performance level 
of water services: 
Before: Medium 
After: High  
Contractual hazards: 
Medium 
Figure 6: Summary of data analysis of the East Zone concession 
Source: own figure 
 
The governance structure in the form of a concession seems to be particularly 
well aligned because the level of asset specificity is between a medium and low 
level, nearly implying the applicability of market governance according to the 
theory of TCE. As mentioned, a concession is arguably on the edge of full pri-
vatisation, denoting market governance, but retains some hybrid characteristics. 
It thus seems to allow the economisation of transaction costs and efficiency 
gains through higher incentive intensity. The medium level of contractual haz-
ards also more or less confirms this alignment of governance structure and the 
misalignment before. Although re-negotiations have taken place, it should be 
recognised that a solution, which the public and private partner were able to 
accept, could be found for every issue. MWCI and MWSS were even able to 
overcome the difficulties during the Asian financial crisis. Referring back to the 
performance levels of the East Zone concession in Section 3.3.1, the analysis 
demonstrates that the service provision in the water sector improved consider-
ably after the implementation of the concession. Hence, based on the theoretical 
frame of TCE, the study ascribes this at least partly to the alignment of govern-
ance structure and an economisation of transaction costs.  
5.3 Transaction characteristics of the West Zone concession 
Although we could assume that the degree of transaction costs is similar in the 
East Zone and West Zone concessions, the subsequent analysis using TCE will 
show that there are some crucial differences. This is particularly true for the 
level of asset specificity. As mentioned, TCE argues that as the levels of asset 
specificity and uncertainty surrounding a transaction increase, the need for 
contractual safeguards increases as well. Hence, the following examination of 
the characteristics of transactions in light of the theory of TCE will reveal that 
the governance structure in the form of a concession is not well suited to handle 
and organise the water transaction and hence transaction costs. This may also 
have led to the rather poor performance of the West Zone concessionaire. 
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5.3.1 Asset specificity 
First, the level of asset specificity, as measured by the properties of raw water, 
is considerably higher in the West Zone concession compared to the East Zone. 
In most of the service area, MWSI also relies on the Angat-Ipo-La Mesa Dam 
Raw Water System. The raw water eventually flows to the La Mesa Treatment 
Plants 1 and 2, where it requires the level of treatment described above, namely 
physical and chemical treatment plus disinfection. However, in order to be able 
to provide water to the southern parts of the concession area, MWSI tapped 
Laguna Lake as an additional water source, with the water being treated in the 
Putatan treatment plant (MWSI 2009b; Chief Finance Officer, interview, 
02/09/2011). In the southern parts, it is not feasible to use raw water from the 
Angat-Ipo-La Mesa Dam System, as the water distribution system is either non-
existent or in a very poor condition (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 
02/09/2011). Compared to Angat Dam, pollution levels in Laguna Lake are 
much higher due to more residents and factories beside the lake, so that the raw 
water requires a complicated treatment process. This includes the use of specific 
technologies, namely membrane filtration and reverse osmosis (MWSI 2009a: 4; 
MWSI 2009b). This technology is the first of its kind being used in the Philip-
pines, implying that it is not well tested. Moreover, it raises treatment costs, as 
it is very energy-intensive. Investments in these unproven technologies are 
particularly risky for the private partner. The regulator might argue that the 
expenditures are not prudently and efficiently incurred, for example if the tech-
nology is not working properly, so that it may disallow MWSI to recoup the 
expenditures (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011).  
The second indicator to assess the level of asset specificity, namely the origin 
of raw water, is judged to be low. Similar to MWCI, in the West Zone conces-
sion, more than 97 per cent of raw water stems from surface water sources of 
the Angat-Ipo-La Mesa Dam Raw Water System and from Laguna Lake (MWSI 
n.d.; MWSI 2009b). Hardly any expensive and highly technical pumping sys-
tems are needed to obtain and distribute the water (Chief Finance Officer, inter-
view, 02/09/2011).  
With regard to the third indicator, i.e. riskiness of loans and investments, the 
level of asset specificity is arguably high. The distribution system in the West 
Zone was not only in a poorer condition as compared to the East Zone, but 
there were also major unpredictable hazards. Accordingly, the West Zone con-
cessionaire inherited the older parts of the distribution system with pipes da-
ting back to Spanish colonial times. Some parts of the distribution system were 
more than a hundred years old (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011; 
Public Servant, interview, 08/09/2011; Manager, email interview, 05/01/2011). 
Moreover, at the point of privatisation in 1997 the NRW value was above 66 per 
cent in the West Zone concession, implying that the distribution system was in 
poor condition (MWSS-RO 2010b). This high value in MWSI’s service area, es-
pecially compared to the NRW level of only 45 per cent in the East Zone, is par-
ticularly interesting when taking into consideration some of the assumptions of 
the public partner prior to privatisation. Before the division of the service area 
into an East and West Zone, the West Zone was assumed to have a more devel-
oped infrastructure requiring less capital expenditure. This was also the reason 
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why MWSI was required to repay 90 per cent of MWSS’s foreign denominated 
debts in the form of concession fees, whereas MWCI only had to pay 10 per cent 
(Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 2). In concrete figures, it meant that “if [MWSI] 
had $800 million dollars of concession fees to pay, [MWCI] probably only had 
80 million dollars” (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). As a conse-
quence, after the Asian financial crisis the much larger concession fees led to 
major financial constraints, resulting in long and complicated re-negotiations 
(Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor, 2008). 
5.3.2 Uncertainty 
Unlike the level of asset specificity, the degree of uncertainty in the West Zone 
concession is comparable to that in the East Zone concession. Accordingly, the 
origin of raw water is surface water stemming mainly from the Angat-Ipo-La 
Mesa Dam Raw Water system and a smaller part from Laguna Lake (Chief Fi-
nance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). Therefore in this case too, the availability 
of water can be assessed fairly easily, so that uncertainty is low.  
Second, with regard to the availability of raw water, MWSI faces similar 
problems as MWCI, meaning that currently it has enough water available to 
meet demand. However, the future is still unclear as a result of the impacts of 
the weather phenomenon El Niño and the riskiness of relying on a single source 
which is close to an earthquake fault line. Although MWSI was able to tap a 
second water source, namely Laguna Lake, it is impossible for the company to 
rely only on this source due to the substantial treatment costs. Accordingly, 
MWSI also aims to meet the demand in the southern parts of the concession 
area by relying on Angat Dam as soon as the proper distribution system is put 
in place (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). Similar to the East Zone 
concessionaire, MWSI is also actively looking for new water sources. As men-
tioned, this could become a contentious issue, as the concession agreement does 
not clearly define whose responsibility it is to develop this new source (Chief 
Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011; Manager, interview, 05/09/2011). 
Third, the length of the contract influences the level of uncertainty. Similar 
to the contract duration of the East Zone concession, MWSI and MWSS initially 
set the concession period to 25 years in 1997 and extended it by another fifteen 
years in 2009, so that the concession is now envisioned to end in 2037 (Chief 
Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011). Hence, uncertainty with regard to this 
indicator is quite high. 
5.3.3 Contractual hazards 
The concession between MWSI and MWSS exhibits a high level of contractual 
hazards, especially compared to the East Zone concession. Similar to MWCI, 
MWSI had to face two major crises shortly after the completion of the privatisa-
tion process, namely the Asian financial crisis and the rather severe incidence of 
the El Niño phenomenon. Unlike MWCI, MWSI was not able to meet 90 per 
cent of MWSS’s foreign denominated debts from concession fees. After the 
Asian financial crisis and the subsequent devaluation of the Philippine peso, 
MWSI’s concession fees also doubled. As a consequence, MWSI was no longer 
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able to borrow money for capital expenditure to improve the water infrastruc-
ture. Instead, it ended up using borrowed money and equity to pay the conces-
sion fees (Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 1-3; Esguerra 2003: 6-7). Despite tariff 
increases granted under an EPA and, later on under Amendment No. 1, MWSI 
failed to consolidate its finances. In December 2002, the private partner gave 
notice of early contract termination. The dispute ended before the courts, after 
the arbitration mechanisms defined in the concession agreement failed. After a 
long and expensive struggle, MWSI underwent debt and capital restructuring, 
which resulted in MWSS becoming the largest shareholder of the company in 
2005. Shortly after the process was completed, MWSS launched an international 
tender for the right to subscribe to their shares (Chiplunkar/Duenas/Flor 2008: 
4).9 As mentioned earlier, DCMI-MPIC took over the ownership of MWSI in 
January 2007. Although some improvements in service quality can be observed 
since the change of ownership, the West Zone concessionaire still lags behind, 
especially when compared to the East Zone.  
The second re-negotiation concerned the extension of the concession period 
for another fifteen years. Although this re-negotiation demonstrates the confi-
dence in the concession between MWSS and MWSI, including the new owners, 
it reveals the incompleteness of the contract due to an underestimation of the 
costs of providing sanitation services. The third potential point of contention, 
which may affect the West Zone concession similar to the East Zone concession, 
might be the harnessing of a new water source, already discussed in Section 
6.1.3 (Chief Finance Officer, interview, 02/09/2011; Manager, interview, 
05/09/2011; Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 
11/10/2011). 
5.4 Misalignment of governance structure in the West Zone 
concession 
Based on the analysis of the level of transaction costs as characterised by the 
degree of asset specificity and uncertainty, and the level of contractual hazards, 
the study concludes that the hybrid governance structure in the form of a con-
cession between MWSI and MWSS is a misalignment. Due to a medium to high 
level of asset specificity and a medium level of uncertainty, the concession, 
which is, as mentioned, an organisational construct between market and hybrid 
forms of governance, failed to economise transaction costs. This is also exempli-
fied by the high levels of contractual hazards, resulting in a termination of the 
contract between MWSI and MWSS and a complicated change of ownership.  
Before the implementation of the concession, the governance structures 
could have been better aligned as well, as a hybrid form of governance would 
presumably have simultaneously increased incentive intensity and economised 
transaction cost. In view of that, a management or a lease contract, which are 
clear hybrids, might have been a better choice. Nevertheless, according to the 
                                                          
9  For a detailed description of the debt and capital restructuring, see 
Chiplunkar, Duenas and Flor (2008). 
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theory of TCE, the hierarchical form of governance is also an applicable option. 
Figure 7 again summarises the levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and con-
tractual hazards, the corresponding governance structure according to TCE and 
the performance level of the West Zone concessionaire. 
 
Figure 7: Figure 6: Summary of data analysis of the West Zone concession 
 
Source: own figure 
 
Referring back to the performance levels in the West Zone concession in Section 
3.3.2, the analysis has shown that after the implementation of the PPP, water 
service provision did not improve; indeed, to some extent it deteriorated. 
Again, based on the theoretical frame of TCE, the study ascribes this to the mis-
alignment of governance structure and a dis-economisation of transaction costs. 
It would be interesting to know whether the performance of the water utility 
would have improved with the same amount of capital expenditure if it had 
remained in public hands. The very costly re-negotiations could certainly have 
been avoided if a different governance structure, which would have better 
economised transaction costs, had been chosen. 
To sum up, the previous analysis seems to support the hypothesis that a 
misalignment of governance structures has a negative impact on the perfor-
mance of service provision in the water sector. An alignment of governance 
structures according the theory of TCE led to improved water services in the 
East Zone concession, while a misalignment of governance structures in the 
West Zone concessions resulted in a deteriorated performance. Hence, the two 
cases exemplified variations in the dependent variable, namely the performance 
levels of the two concessionaires, and the explanatory variables, namely the 
level of transaction costs and a (mis)alignment of governance structures. Simul-
taneously, other possible influencing factors, such as the regulatory strategy, 
the contract design and the political and economic environment, including the 
general water sector reform and unforeseen shocks are the same in both conces-
sions. They are therefore constant. The investigation thus shows that no general 
conclusions about the water privatisation can be drawn without carefully dif-
ferentiating between the two concession areas. The results suggest that in the 
privatisation process in Metro Manila, the different characteristics of the trans-
Independent variable Intermediary variable Dependent variable 
Asset specificity: 
Medium to high 
Uncertainty: 
Medium 
Performance of 
water service 
provision  
Before: Medium 
After: Medium to 
low  
Before: (Mis)alignment 
of governance structure 
 hierarchy (public 
service) 
After: Misalignment of 
governance structure  
market/hybrid (conces-
sion) 
Contractual hazards: 
High 
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actions in the concession areas were not properly considered. As a consequence, 
the two concessionaires took very divergent paths after privatisation. 
6. Conclusion 
As was shown, the introduction of PSP in the water sector is not a general pan-
acea for the efficient and effective water services that are urgently needed in 
many developing countries. However, in some cases it may lead to improved 
performance of the water sector, including increased access to water, better 
service quality and reduced water losses. In contrast, in other cases it may result 
in poorer performance, exemplified by high tariffs and negative externalities on 
health and the environment. This study tried to identify which circumstances 
and conditions contribute to the success and failure of PSP in the water sector. 
The theory of TCE proved to be a valuable framework to scrutinise the role that 
transaction costs play in determining the relative effectiveness of different or-
ganisational forms of PSP.  
The most-similar case study of the two water utilities in Metro Manila in 
light of the theory of TCE arguably confirmed the hypothesis that a misaligned 
governance structure according to the level of transaction costs leads to a dete-
riorated performance of service provision in the water sector. More specifically, 
in the East Zone concession of Metro Manila, it was demonstrated that service 
provision in the water sector improved, with increased access to water, less 
water rationing, lower NRW levels and cost-covering and affordable tariffs. In 
this case, the organisational mode of governance in the form of a concession 
was aligned according to the degree of transactions costs as measured by a (low 
to) medium level of asset specificity and medium level uncertainty. Moreover, 
the limited number of contractual hazards further confirmed the alignment. In 
contrast, in the West Zone concession, the study showed that a misalignment 
according to a (medium to) high level of transaction costs, as measured by a 
(medium to) high level of asset specificity and medium level of uncertainty, led 
to a widely recognised failure to reform the water sector. The performance of 
the water utility could not be improved and in some periods it actually wors-
ened, with increased water rationing and NRW levels, for example. Again, the 
misalignment was also verified by a high degree of contractual hazards result-
ing in the termination of the contract. The level of asset specificity in particular 
is very different in both concessions. While MWCI’s raw water sources only 
require conventional treatment technology, part of MWSI’s raw water source 
necessitate the use of specific, much less tested technologies. Furthermore, 
MWCI inherited the newer parts of the water infrastructure, which were in 
much better condition, whereas some sections of the distribution system in the 
West Zone concession area dated back to Spanish colonial times. In addition, 
the concessionaires faced different amounts of concession fees, which impacted 
on the riskiness of investments with MWCI having to pay only 10 per cent and 
MWSI 90 per cent of MWSS’s former foreign denominated loans. Even though 
this factor was included in the analysis in relation to heightened asset specifici-
ty, the impact of this difference in light of the currency risk might have been 
underestimated (Neville 2011: 253). Table 7 gives another overview of the find-
ings.  
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Table 7: Overview of findings 
 
  
Independent variable: 
- Transaction Costs 
- Contractual hazards 
 
- (Low to ) medium 
- Low to medium 
 
- Medium to high 
- High 
Intermediary variable: 
- (Mis-)alignment of 
governance structure 
Before: Misalignment 
After: Alignment 
Before: Alignment 
After: Misalignment 
Dependent variable: 
- Performance 
Before: Medium 
After: High 
Before: Medium 
After: Medium to low 
Source: own figure 
 
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that an alignment of governance struc-
tures cannot guarantee the success of any privatisation process. As was sug-
gested in Section 2.3, internal factors related to the management of water utili-
ties also have a major impact on their success and failure. This, however, ap-
plies to both publicly or privately run water utilities and it also holds true with 
regard to the two concessions in Metro Manila. Accordingly, corporate govern-
ance and financial and operational management were other key factors that 
determined the widely recognised success of MWCI and failure of MWSI 
(Wu/Malaluan 2008; Neville 2011). First, concerning corporate governance, un-
like MWCI, MWSI largely engaged its related foreign subsidiaries as manage-
ment and technical consultancies without competitive bidding, which substan-
tially increased costs (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 217-219; Neville 2011: 256.). Second, 
MWCI made adjustments with regard to its financial management in response 
to the Asian financial crisis. This implied that the company focused on domestic 
and smaller loans for capital expenditures, aimed solely at areas that were most 
likely to produce financial improvements. These adjustments were not made by 
MWSI (Wu/Malaluan 2008: 219-221). Third, whereas MWCI retrained, support-
ed and encouraged its employees in various ways, MWSI failed to increase its 
employees’ capacities and Filipino employees even felt like second-class staff 
(Wu/Malaluan 2008: 221-223; Neville, 2011: 256; Manager, interview, 
05/09/2011). These findings are also confirmed by all interviewees (Manager, 
interview, 05/09/2011; Public Servant, interview, 08/09/2011; Chief Finance Of-
ficer, interview, 02/09/2011; Wastewater Headline Manager, interview, 
07/09/2011; Manager/Research and Planning Executive Assistant, interview, 
11/10/2011). 
Although performance is slowly improving in the West Zone concession 
since the change of ownership, pointing to an improved management strategy, 
this report has demonstrated that MWSI is still having difficulties meeting the 
contractual targets. In relation to this, the continuously high NRW levels are 
particularly striking, as reducing NRW offers the best prospects of increasing 
efficiency and financial viability. It may be premature to fully evaluate the new 
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owners of MWSI and it remains to be seen which way MWSI will go in the com-
ing years. Despite these additional determining factors, a certain trend becomes 
visible through the analysis of the two most-similar case studies, exemplifying 
the impact of a (mis)alignment of governance structures on the performance of 
service provision in the water sector. The results suggest that there is no abso-
lute advantage of one governance structure, be it a hierarchical form of govern-
ance (public provision), a hybrid form of governance, or on the edge of market 
governance (concession). Rather, a comparative advantage of the different gov-
ernance structures can be observed, depending on the characteristics of the 
transaction.  
Putting the analysis in broader perspective, with reference to other water 
privatisation processes in the last decades, it seems questionable that all of them 
would have been initiated if transaction costs and their determining characteris-
tics had been considered. Accordingly, it seems very likely that many water 
utilities in developing countries, especially those in the numerous megacities, 
figure high transaction costs. Accordingly, referring back to some of the indica-
tors for asset specificity and uncertainty, it can be stated that (i) raw water 
sources are increasingly polluted, necessitating increasingly sophisticated  
treatment technologies; (ii) due to the overexploitation of water sources, the 
availability of both surface and groundwater sources is decreasing, which not 
only exacerbates water scarcity but also impacts negatively on water quality 
(Engel et al. 2011); (iii) due to the aforementioned under-investment in the wa-
ter sector, water distribution systems tend to be old and in a rather poor condi-
tion (see, for example, Bakker 2010: 87), enhancing the riskiness of investments. 
This implies that public sector involvement in the provision of water services 
remains indispensable, so that transaction costs are economised through an 
alignment of governance structures. However, to confirm this statement, wide-
ranging analyses of more (mis)aligned governance structures in the water sector 
in light of the theory of TCE are needed. This may also help to tackle the im-
mense challenges facing the water sector in many developing countries. 
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